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da Text of the Statement by General Ojukwu on the Situation in Defeated Biafra, The New York Times, 16 gennaio 1970
- For three years we have fought against overwhelming odds. Our conduct of the war has contrasted sharply with that of the Nigerian hordes. We were always aware of our limitation and therefore have never discontinued our efforts for peace and a negotiated settlement.
- We had relied on the conscience of the world to respect the rights of our people to self‐determination and security We have been frustrated by an international conspiracy against the interest of the African. Yet, believing in the justice of our cause and the ultimate triumph of truth over false hood, outnumbered and out gunned, we have grimly held back the unrelenting enemy for three grueling years with bare hands.
- Nigeria throughout this war has distinguished her self for a lack of control over her armed forces. It is therefore most unlikely that, flushed with intoxication of an unexpected military victory, she will be able to exercise any measure of control on her forces now on the rampage.
- The sole motive behind Nigeria's determination to draw an iron curtain over Biafra and exclude international observers, relief agencies, journalists whom they have not carefully picked themselves, is to make sure that the atrocities they will certainly carry out in Biafra are unseen and unreported in the world press.
- Abbiamo combattuto come combattono gli eroi. Abbiamo osato come solo gli dei osano. Siamo disillusi dall'insensibilità del mondo verso la disgrazia del nostro popolo. Eppure, perché la nostra causa è giusta, crediamo che non abbiamo perso la guerra, solo che il campo di battaglia è cambiato. Siamo convinti che il Biafra sopravviverà.
- We have fought as heroes fight. We have dared as only gods dare. We are disillusioned by the world's insensitivity to the plight of our people. Yet because our cause is just, we believe we have not lost the war, only that the battle field has changed. We are convinced that Biafra will survive.
- Il Biafra è nato dal sangue degli innocenti massacrati in Nigeria durante i pogrom del 1966. Biafra vivrà in eterno non come un sogno ma come la personificazione delle speranze amate di un popolo che vede nello stabilimento di questo territorio una ultima speranza per la pace e la sicurezza. Biafra non può essere distrutta con solo la forza d'armi.
- Biafra was born out of the blood of innocents slaughtered in Nigeria during the pogroms of 1966. Biafra will ever live not as a dream but as the crystalization of the cherished hopes of a people who see in the establishment of this territory a last hope for peace and security. Biafra cannot be destroyed by mere force of arms.
Per Haing Ngor[modifica]
- In rural Cambodia, traditional health care is provided by spirit doctors, who interpret dreams, cast spells and use magic, and by herbalists, who make their own medicines from plants. Sometimes the spirit doctors are able to help their patients, because the patients believe in the treatments; and some of the herbal medicines are good. (The herbal cure for syphilis, for example, a strong, nasty-smelling tea boiled from bamboo joints, black pepper and about a dozen other ingredients, is reasonably effective, though why it works is hard to say.) But traditional medicine has no concept of infection and no real method of surgery. It is helpless against many of the diseases that are easily treated by Western techniques. (p. 51)
- Lon Nol did nothing to stop the corruption. He didn't seem to realize that the bonjour and the war were connected - that officers who were interested only in bribes wouldn't fight. He had no real strategy for fighting the communists. He just stayed in his office, making vague, mystical plans for restoring Cambodia to the greatness of its times in the ancient empire at Angkor. He consulted astrologers. He sponsored an organization called the Khmer-Mon Institute, which tried to prove that the dark-skinned Khmer race was superior to the light-skinned peoples like the Chinese and Vietnamese. In Phnom Penh, which was racially mixed and Western-oriented, his ideas were treated like an embarassing joke. We didn't realize how dangerous he was. Under his regime, racial prejudice against Chinese-Cambodians flared up, and his troops massacred thousands of ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians. (p. 60-61)
- In the Khmer language, angka means "organization". Angka was the Organization - logically, I supposed, the Khmer Rouge command group. What did that imply? That the guerrillas were going to try to organize the Cambodians? That wasn't likely. If there was ever a disorganized people, it was us. Peasants who farmed when and where they wanted, employees who were casual about showing up for work, a society so laissez-faire that nothing ever got done. Even Sihanouk hadn't been able to organize us when he was our ruler, and he had tried. (p. 82)
- To them, anything in an ampule was medicine. If a patient died after getting an injection, it was the patient's fault. What was the purpose of a revolution like that? I wondered. What was the gain, what was the progress, when a society went from ignorant herbal healers to monkeys like the Khmer Rouge? What about the kind of knowledge that was taught in medical school? Wasn't it worth anything? Were we supposed to forget that it existed? (p. 148)